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ABSTRACT 
Sugar factories are one of the giant economy drivers the government in Ethiopia 
solely owns and manages. Due to the high product demand and key roles the 
sugar sector plays in the economy, the government refused to privatize these 
factories irrespective of the internal and external forces that urge the economic 
sector liberalization. In recent years, however, the government has launched an 
initiative to privatize some large scale state-owned enterprises including the sugar 
factories either fully or partially. Despite some private investors have shown 
interest to take part in the investment of the sugar sector, the initiative has not yet 
materialized for the reasons no reputable researches have revealed. This study 
aims to examine the factors affecting the private sector involvement in Ethiopia’s 
sugar sector privatization process. The study is analytical and uses a mixed 
research design. Data are collected using a structured questionnaire and Focus 
Group Discussion. The questionnaire that comprises 30 items is delivered to 84 
participants. 78 participants properly filled in and returned the questionnaire while 
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6 are not. The impact of factors represented in each item is measured by the 5 
point scale from “Very High” to “Very Low.” Meanwhile, two rounds of discussions 
are held with focus groups. 13 individuals selected from multiple sectors 
participated in the discussion. A mixed-method is used for data analysis. The 
analysis of quantitative data, which employ the SPSS to work out the statistical 
measures, and an analytical description of qualitative data are mixed to validate 
the findings through triangulation. The study reveals a number of major issues that 
have been determining the success of sugar sector privatization initiative. 
Concerning legal arrangement, tax regime, restrictive policy on banking, policy of 
price and economic centralism along with lack of policy are found to affect the 
process. From the political stream, government instability, emerging conflicts, and 
fear of potential resistance as well as opposition from the public have an impact 
on the privatization process. While sugar sector inefficiency, poor infrastructure 
and currency instability and have impact from the socio-economic aspect, 
determinant market related factors include logistic cost, poor financial status of the 
enterprises, lack of FOREX and vulnerability to the threat of price volatility in the 
market environment. While launching the initiative to privatize the enterprise 
government has solely owned for decades is taken as a strength, lack of 
commitment to create an enabling legal and institutional environment are 
identified as major pitfalls of the sugar sector privatization process in Ethiopia. 
Thus, it would be soon to confidently conclude the initiative would succeed in the 
absence of the pre-requisites for any successful privatization initiative as learned 
from the literature review. Putting aside less determinant factors, favourable legal 
arrangement that mitigates the impact of major factors this study reveals, and that 
provide reliable protection for the private sector to freely play in the market is 
suggested. Meanwhile, adequate consultation with concerned parties to alleviate 
potential resistance is proposed to develop the private sector confidence in the 
process and public acceptance.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. General Introduction 
The Ethiopian sugar sector is one of the state-owned industries. The industry has 
been playing crucial roles in the Ethiopian economy through import substitution, 
sugar supply for the local market, and job creation. The eight operational sugar 
factories and five development projects have so far employed more than 62,000 
people directly on a permanent and temporary basis. In the country in which 
unemployment is high, 1.79% in 2018 for instance, this number cannot be 
undermined, and, perhaps, significantly high when compared to other sectors 
(National Planning Commission, 2018). Irrespective of this, sugar sector 
development is the most capital intensive. In its ambitious GTP of filling the 
growing sugar demand and then earning foreign currency through export, the 
Ethiopian government has been financing the renovation as well as new 
development sugar projects since 2010. With fierce finance short come due to 
high deficit (about 2.5% of GDP in 2018/19) (International Monetary Fund, 2019; 
CSA, 2019), the government learned transferring ownership of the sugar sector is 
the first choice to get rid of the financial burden.  
Privatization is the process and program of divesting government ownership in 
state-owned-enterprises to the private sector (Usman and Joseph, 2016). It may 
take different forms, such as direct sale, usually via tender or direct negotiation, 
public offer, joint venture, and lease, among others (Fun, 2010). Privatization is by 
nature a highly politicized activity (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994). So the process 
and methods vary from country to country. Moreover, the process is not as 
smooth as one might imagine, because, depending on the socio-economic and 
political situation of a country, multifaceted factors determine the whole process. 
Although privatization is a post-colonization economic reform movement globally, 
Ethiopia is a late starter in Africa (Estrin and Pelletier, 2018). As Estrin and 
Pelletier (2018) added, the francophone West African countries were first to start 
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the privatization program in the late 1970s, but the “late starters” including 
Ethiopia did not begin to privatize until the early to mid-1990s.  
Until 1991, when Ethiopia was under the socialist Dergue regime’s command 
economy, major industries were reserved for the state and only about 159 
enterprises were nationalized (Selvam, 2007). The Dergue fell and replaced by 
the Ethiopian Peoples Republic Democratic Front (EPRDF) led government in 
1991. In the economic reform plan of the new government, therefore, privatization 
of the state-owned enterprises became an agenda.  
Privatization was urged by external pressure from the international financial 
institutions (Nellis, 2008), and internally by the large debt leading to a high budget 
deficit as well as poor growth prospects of the enterprises (Selvam, 2007).  
Moreover, it was part of the initiative to facilitate the economic transformation into 
market-oriented (EPRDF, 2018) and to reverse the socio-economic crisis 
(Selvam, 2007). As explicitly stated in the privation proclamation, privatization had 
triplet objectives: “To generate revenue required for financing development 
activities undertaken by the government; to change the role and participation of 
the government in the economy to enable it to exert more effort on activities 
requiring its attention; to promote the country’s economic development through 
encouraging the expansion of the private sector” (Proclamation No.146/1998, p.1).   
Available literatures vary in presenting the number of state-owned Enterprises 
privatized since 1994, but Girum estimated 360 to 400 (2018). Moreover, the 
program focused on limited industries such as textiles and apparel, food, 
beverages and tobacco, tanning, leather, and footwear and chemical products 
(Wodajo and Senbet, 2017, p. 14). 
With the principal paradigm of the developmental state, the Ethiopian government 
has sustained and set up its own companies as a means to provide dynamism to 
the national economy. As a result, several enterprises are created in sectors such 
as transpiration, communication, banking and insurance, manufacturing, etc. The 
sugar sector is the one that remained under state ownership. 
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Re-established in 2010, the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation owns 13 sugar 
manufacturing mills along with the sugarcane estates across the country 
(Regulation No. 916/2015). Frustrated by the external debt burden and the need 
to improve the sector’s performance, however, the Ethiopian government 
launched the sugar sector privatization initiative in 2015. This made the sector the 
first among the “large” state-owned enterprises to set for privatization. However, 
the initiative was pending to date. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the factors that have been 
affecting the initiative of sugar factories privatization in Ethiopia. The dissertation 
answered the question, “what factors are affecting the sugar sector privatization in 
Ethiopia?” The dissertation employed a descriptive-analytical approach. A mixed 
research design that combined quantitative and qualitative data was employed in 
this dissertation.  
This dissertation was organized into 6 chapters. Following this general overview, 
the background of the study with the problem statement and research objectives 
were presented in chapter 1. Chapter 2 consisted of a literature review to study 
the origin of privatization and the common factors affecting the success of 
privatization as suggested by various academic works.  
In chapter 3, the research methodology was presented in detail. The data 
obtained through questionnaires and discussions were analysed in chapter 4. In 
chapter 5, the findings of the data analysis were discussed. Finally, conclusion, 
recommendations, and limitations of the dissertation were presented in chapter 6. 
 
1.2. Background of the Dissertation 
With a population of more than 110 million people, Ethiopia is the second most 
populous country in the Horn of Africa. Though Ethiopia’s economy has been 
stated to be “the fastest” compared to the performance of African countries in the 
region, however, a low per capita income of about $783 pushes the country down 
to one of the poorest nations in the world (National Planning Commission, 2018). 
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Nevertheless, the country has a vision to reach the lower-middle-income status by 
2025 with positive economic changes taking place in recent times (National 
Planning Commission, 2018).  
The vision is not merely eloquent but supported by well-articulated plans and 
strategies. Two versions of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) which the 
country has been implementing since 2010/11 are the most powerful instruments 
to achieve the goals of such a well-recognized plan.  In the earlier version of the 
GTP, named as GTP I, which runs to 2014/15, notable accomplishments have 
been enumerated in the social and economic spectrum. For instance, the 
country’s economy experienced “strong, broad-based growth averaging 9.9% a 
year from 2010/08 to 2014/15, compared to a regional average” (World Bank, 
2019). Confirming to this, the Ministry of Finance (2019) added that the Gross 
Domestic Product in Ethiopia reached 9.41 percent in mid-2019 with the 
annual growth rate averaged 6.24 percent from 1998 to 2018 in the course of 
implementing the second phase of GTP II (2015/16 to 2019/20). Thus, Ethiopia’s 
stretched growth and transformation plan has therefore played essential roles in 
national development. 
Towards this development, different economic sectors contributed to a varying 
degree. The construction and service sectors had the lion’s share while agriculture 
and manufacturing made a lower contribution (Ethiopian Economics Association, 
2019). Affirming that GDP growth was driven by services (8.8% growth) and 
industry (12.2%), the National Planning Commission (2018) adds the growth was 
facilitated by the government’s stable spending on public infrastructure and the 
sectors it owns, among others.  
Perhaps, the Ethiopian government has been investing much resource in multi-
industrial sectors. The sugar sector is the one government has started in the first 
GTP (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 2018). In the years since 2011, 10 new sugar 
development projects were commenced while the operating sugar factories were 
innovated to grow their production capacity. Generally, the Ethiopian government 
has been operating the entire sugar sector the privatization initiative was launched 
recently. In this dissertation, the process of sugar sector privatization and the 
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impact of legal, political, socio-economic, and market-related factors were 
assessed. 
 
 1.3. Problem Statement 
Ethiopia’s economic growth is frequently mentioned as driven by the investment of 
government itself in infrastructure, which in turn is facilitated by its pro-poor 
economic policy. The policy in turn is emanated from the developmental 
democratic paradigm of EPRDF, the current singular party ruling Ethiopia since 
1991, and it favours ‘selective’ state interference in the national economic 
activities (EPRDF, 2018). Leaving debates on such politically pronounced 
justifications and rationale of owning big public enterprises, concerned parties and 
citizens in Ethiopia have been urging the government to transfer those state-
owned enterprises like telecom, banks and factories to the private investment. 
Though the debates lasted for decades and there has been pressure from the 
international community to liberalize the economy, the government insisted on 
owning these selected sectors while privatizing other government-owned 
properties including hotels, farms, factories and some other manufacturing 
industries (Dawar and Ndlovu, 2018).  
For the first time in Ethiopia, the EPRDF-led government showed interest to 
privatize the sugar sector in 2015. In the sugar sector, the government has been 
not only been the sole owner and investor but also supplier, manufacturer, 
marketer who set selling price of the product, and product distributor (Ethiopian 
Economics Association, 2019). The sugar privatization initiative news was 
therefore taken as a new milestone.  
Following the news, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MoFEC), 
now renamed as the Ministry of Finance- MoF, announced an international call to 
sell the share of sugar factories in the country (Birhanu, 2019). Perhaps, FDRE 
Investment Commission, an organization in charge of managing investment deals 
(Ethiopian Investment Regulation, 2013), has been in closed discussions with 
potential private investors to sell out the sugar sector though the deal did not 
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succeed as expected (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 2018). Hence, the call for 
expression of interest was announced. Following the call announcement, several 
companies from different countries showed their interest to invest in the Ethiopian 
sugar sector (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 2018). Even though the Ethiopian 
Investment Commission could license hundreds of private investors interested in 
multiple industries and manufacturing sectors, the sugar sector could not attract 
the private investors’ interest for reasons not well investigated. The doubt in 
realizing the foreign direct investment may continue according to 
(newsbusinessethiopia, 2019) by indicating that the Ethiopia’s privatization 
urgency sparks debate.  
Having gone through turbulent political instability and ethnic conflicts, Ethiopia 
saw a remarkable political change in mid-2018 with the coming into power of a 
new Prime Minister. In his first inaugural speech, the current Ethiopian premier 
announced the transfer of public enterprises to private hands as part of changes 
in social, economic and political sectors. The privatization of the sugar sector has 
become an agenda once again. The private investors who showed interest during 
the earlier privatization calls were requested to submit their proposal. Despite 
some investor groups have been paying frequent visits to sugar project areas and 
collecting information about the sector, none responded officially to the call until 
this research completed. With past experiences the researcher had gained 
working as a deputy CEO in Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, and the growing 
interest to succeed in the current privatization initiative, therefore, the researcher 
was interested in addressing the problem.  
 
1.4. Objectives of the Dissertation 
1.4.1. General Objective: 
 To examine the factors affecting the private sector involvement in 
Ethiopia’s sugar sector privatization process. 
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1.4.2. Specific Objectives: 
i. To identify major factors relating to legal, political, socio-economic and 
market that hinder the private investors’ involvement in the sugar sector 
privatization initiative; 
ii. To determine the strengths and defects of the sugar enterprises 
privatization initiative; 
iii. To speculate the future of privatization in the sugar sector based on 
available evidences; and, 
iv. To point out the major issues the government needs to address 
immediately. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 2.1. Ethiopia: Country Background 
Ethiopia, officially known as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, is 
located in the north-eastern region of Africa. Ethiopia is the ninth largest and 
second most populated country in the continent following Nigeria. According to the 
latest available data, the current population of Ethiopia is 112,952,776 
(Worldometers, 2019).  
 
 
Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com 
Figure 2.1:  Physical map of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia extends from 30º - 15º north of the equator and 33º - 48º east of the 
Greenwich Meridian with a total area of 1.14 Million Sq. Km. Ethiopia is a 
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landlocked country bordered by Sudan, Kenya, South Sudan, Somalia Djibouti, 
and Eritrea.  
The governance set up in Ethiopia is based on a constitution that established the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1995 (FDRE, 1995). The constitution 
indicates that the federal state comprises nine autonomous states and two city 
administrations. The FDRE is structured along the lines of a bicameral parliament, 
with the council of People‘s Representatives being the highest authority of the 
federal government. Regional states have considerable authority and 
responsibility which they exercise through councils at their respective 
administrative tiers from region to zone, and kebele (FDRE, 1995).  
Ethiopia has no scarcity with resources, whether, human, water, and land. 
Concerning sugar production, for instance, the viability studies ESISC conducted 
in different times showed that there are additional seven suitable sites for sugar 
cane plantation besides 303,500 ha land already identified to be suitable in 7 sites 
at the main river basins in Ethiopia (Ethiopian Investment Agency, 2012). 
Moreover, there is more than 10,000 ha land identified to be apt for cane 
plantation in the rainy season. Existing evidences show that there is a persistently 
high rate of poverty, relatively low labour market participation and consistent 
underemployment particularly concentrated among prime-age workers (15- 30 
years) (Jerusalem, 2016). This would make Ethiopia a very attractive location for 
private investors to invest in the production and processing of sugar cane. Hence, 
Ethiopia, with a population of over 112.9 million, has plentiful, hard-working, 
inexpensive and easily trainable labour force any investment might require.  
 
2.2. Economic Sector in Ethiopia 
Although Ethiopia is the oldest non-colonized state in Africa, the social, economic 
and political policies have not been indigenous. In recent times, however, it is 
evident that Ethiopia has made remarkable pace along its developmental pathway 
with its political paradigm the government calls “developmental” (Tesfaye, 2018). 
The two-digit sustained average economic growth over the past decade has made 
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the country one of the fastest-growing economies in the world through the 
development was led by the public sectors (IFC, 2019).  In the country’s economic 
development strategy, sectors such as telecom, utility, and the air/sea transport 
are allowed to operate only as strict public monopolies (World Bank, 2018).  
Based on the lessons Ethiopia learned through the implementation of 
development plans in past times in general and the prominent GTP I, the country 
has embarked on a journey of becoming a low middle-income economy by 2025. 
In the stride to attain this goal, the Ethiopian government is advised to deepening 
structural change in its economic sector, which has been led by low labour-
intensive sectors, to sustain the fast growth observed in the past consecutive 
years. The Second version GTP (2015/16-2019/20) envisages an emergence in 
the form of desirable outcomes of structural transformation, i.e. focus on 
industrialization. Perhaps, this is assumed to be a response for a radical shift from 
agriculture-led development to industry-led transformation (National Planning 
Commission, 2018). While GTP II is about to conclude this year, agriculture has 
remained the dominant contributor to economic growth, followed by industry and 
services sectors (Tesfaye, 2018).  
Noting that the outcomes of earlier policies and events affect the pace and 
process of reform in any sector, Larson and Borrell (2001) underline the political 
economy, trade structures, and production characteristics of sugar in Ethiopia are 
different enough from those found in most agricultural markets to warrant special 
consideration. Larson and Borrell (2001) added the main differences, as the 
degree to which international markets are dominated by policy interventions and 
the effects of preferential trade arrangements, is the inherent tension between 
mills and growers created by sugar's joint-production characteristics, and the 
effect of inconvenient relationship between growers and mills on community 
incomes, assets, and profitability.  
Irrespective of the impacts such policies had on the development of the economic 
sector, the Ethiopia government had been arguing that its intervention has 
contributed to the steady economy recorded in past years. Moreover, the state 
propagates the fact that state owned such public enterprises like telecom, banks 
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and factories not only enabled to control the market so citizens can get such 
services at low prices but also generated finance which the government budget to 
expand infrastructure (Tadesse, 2018). The think thanks and scholars on the other 
hand criticize such interventions have been an obstacle for private sector 
development in the country besides affecting foreign investment flow, which in 
turn can ignite development with little effort (Getayawkal, 2016; International 
Finance Corporation, 2019). This debate lasted for more than two decades before 
the government recently launched its initiative to privatize these enterprises.  
 
2.3. Overview of the Ethiopian Sugar Sector 
The history of coming into existence and the administrative structure of the sugar 
industry in Ethiopia go hand in hand with major political changes that happened in 
the country. It was in the Emperor’s regime that the history of the sugar industry 
emerged in 1951. By then that H.V.A, the Netherland’s Company, entered into the 
sector as a foreign shareholder. Given 5,000 ha land for its sugarcane cultivation, 
the factory started production of 1,400 quintal of sugar in 1954. The second sugar 
factory in Ethiopia, which enhanced the production capacity to 750,000 quintals 
per annum, opened in Shoa in 1962 and entered into production in 1969 by the 
same Netherland Company.  
Following political change in Ethiopia, i.e. replacement of the Emperor by the 
Dergue regime in 1974, the ownership structure of the sugar industry changed. In 
this year, the government snatched the share of foreign companies in the 
operating sugar factories while establishing the third factory in Metehara. 
Administration of the factories along with two Candy Factories in Addis Ababa and 
Asmara transferred to the government.  
The third turning point in Ethiopia’s political change that affected the sugar 
industry happened in 1991 when the Dergue regime fell. One of the economic 
sector arrangements the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front led 
government took in the first year of its power was dissolving the centralized 
administration legislation the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation was entitled to 
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administer all sugar and sweet factories and reestablishment of each as a distinct 
public enterprise (Kamski, 2016). In the same year, 1998, the third sugarcane 
crushing mill came into existence by finance obtained through loans from the 
African Development Bank and Development Fund, Governments of Australia and 
Spain as well as domestic banks of the nation. 
Unlike other mills, as Kamski (2016) stated, this mill, namely Fincha Sugar 
Factory, was executed an annual production capacity twice more than the total 
capacity of the mills on the operation. Moreover, the construction of ethanol plant 
was part of this project. However, commencement of the mill’s production took too 
long due to inefficiency in project management and the weakness of domestic 
contractors involved in the bid to construct the mill. Hence the construction of 
Fincha Sugar Factory that marked a crisis in Ethiopia’s sugar industry which in 
turn put the government’s intervention would likely be less successful (Larson and 
Borrell, 2001). 
Having recognized the challenges that would bottleneck the government’s effort to 
develop sugar industry in a way the factories support economic development 
through job creation and fill currency gap, the government also initiated the 
establishment of a centre that assists the sugar industry through finance and 
insurance by the partnership of the World Bank, insurance companies and the 
three sugar mills themselves six years later (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 2018). 
According to GAIN (2018) report, this centre was the only organ in the sugar 
industry in which non-government parties took part from 1991 to now. Apart from 
this, the value chain of sugar in Ethiopia has been state-controlled. Besides 
production, the government controls the national price of sugar and manage its 
distribution and sale through a national quota system (GAIN, 2018).  Accordingly, 
the retail price of sugar is fixed by the Ministry of Trade. National quota allocations 
are made to different groups of end users (Ministry of Trade, 2017).   
Currently the Industry is led by Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (ESC) established by 
Regulation No. 916/2015. As this time was when the government started 
implementing its Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), ESC had got a lot to do 
to increase the number of sugar factories as well as the amount of sugar 
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production and co-products to meet the growing sugar demand in the country in 
line to its mandate of producing sugar and its by-products for both domestic 
consumption and international market, among others, and thereby get foreign 
currency by exporting sugar (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 2018). The corporation 
was also given authority to manage and control sugar imports, exports and local 
distribution. 
Inline to its mission of creating modern technology and capable human resource 
to develop the nation’s potential to the sector, produce sugar, sugar by-products 
and co-products and take remarkable foreign market share and support the 
nation’s economy beyond satisfying domestic demand, ESC visions to “stand as 
one among ten leading countries of the world in the sugar industry in 2023 based 
on a sustainable growth” (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 2019). Currently, ESC 
manages 13 sugar factories: eight operational and five development projects. 
Generally, the sugar sector in Ethiopia has about half a century age, passed 
through changes in the structure of the sector that manage the sector and showed 
steady changes in the expansion of products. Yet the sector is stumbled in 
meeting its overstated mission and vision and so it calls for deep reform based on 
detailed research. 
 
2.4. The Concept and Forms/Methods of Privatization 
2.4.1. The Concept of Privatization 
The term privatization is defined in different ways. In public management 
spectrum, for instance, any organizational and operational measures government 
take to bring efficiency are identified as a privatization measure (ILO, 2001). In 
such contexts activities such as the public pays charges for the service a public 
enterprise provides, private companies are financed by the government for 
providing certain services for the public, public corporations established by law 
operate as private enterprises under the market doctrine, and liberalization of 
some industries by removing government regulation is conceived as an example 
of privatization (Fun, 2010). However, all these forms indicate state transfers its 
control to the private, but still ownership remains at the hand of the state.  
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Nevertheless, privatization in its narrow context implies the transferring 
government assets to the hands of private sectors fully or partially (Estrin and 
Pelletier, 2018). According to Usman and Joseph (2016), privatization is the 
process and program of divesting government ownership in state-owned 
enterprises to the private sector and the investing public. Moreover, Kayizzi-
Mugerwa argues privatization involves “changes in income flows between groups” 
(Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002) besides the transfer of ownership. Generally, 
privatization in this dissertation is used to refer to the transfer of ownership of the 
sugar factories with or without any share of the government.  
 
2.4.2. Forms/ Methods of Privatization 
Privatization may take different forms. Some of the forms include “negotiated sale 
to certain private firms, management buy-out, and public offering through Initial 
Public Offering-IPO” (Fun, 2010, p. 9). 
Privatization is not a uniform process, not least because of its politicized nature. 
Comparisons among countries are also made difficult by the differences in 
methods used to privatize. Among the methods used to privatize companies have 
been direct sale, usually via tender or direct negotiation, public offer (via the stock 
exchange), joint venture, lease, for example of hotels in national parks, sale of 
assets, and liquidation. Moreover, governments have tended to bunch up their 
sales, for example selling hotels, banks or textile companies at about the same 
time. 
Direct sale has been the most common method used, 100 percent in the case of 
Mozambique, although stock exchanges well developed only in Kenya and 
Ghana, for instance. Common in countries like Kenya, it can also be argued that 
since liquidated companies are written off the books, this might be an easy way 
for bureaucrats to get hold of the assets cheaply, without rousing political interest. 
Fun (2010) on the other hand presented the following policy alternatives 
governments may take when planning a privatization program: 
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1. Remaining status quo – an enterprise would remain as a public entity 
wholly owned by the government but would be operated by commercialized 
management; 
2. Merger of another related enterprise – to merge two wholly government-
owned corporations into a single organization; 
3. Securitization – a form of raising capital from the market without transfer of 
government ownership of assets; 
4. Full privatization – full transfer of government ownership to the private 
sector through negotiated sale to selected private firms and management 
buyout; and, 
5. Partial privatization – partial transfer of government ownership to the 
private sector through the public offering or franchising only part of the 
railway operation. 
The decision of choosing from the given alternatives depends on the goal of the 
privatization program. For instance, the first three policy alternatives could not fulfil 
the government’s goal of enhancing the operational efficiency of the sector by 
introducing more market competition. By remaining status quo or merging with 
other sectors, however, the state-owned sector will still wholly-owned by the 
government.  It would also create a state monopoly which will thus contradict the 
market doctrine.  Securitization is only applicable to the case for generating more 
income but not for improving operational efficiency. Therefore, the most viable 
means to achieve the goal of introducing more market competition for boosting 
operational efficiency would be full/ partial privatization.   
Partial privatization policy instrument is preferable for various reasons. Having the 
government as a shareholder in ownership enhances the public confidence as it 
might protect their interest concerning meeting the demand and controlling price. 
Moreover, partial privatization through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) is better than 
franchising part of an enterprise operation. This is because partial privatization 
allows wider public participation and stimulates the development of the financial 
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market, but franchising, as (Fun, 2010) noted, is likely to arouse opposition and 
lead to co-ordination problems  
 
2.5. Why Privatization of Sugar Industry 
As discussed above, the sugar industry is one of the most difficult sectors to 
invest in, because several factors determine its efficiency in productivity. The need 
to fulfil this expensive commodity challenges nations in various ways. With this in 
mind, it has often been debated among the public about who should own the 
sugar industry.  
As far as the data is available, the global trend shows the sugar industry in many 
nations that dominate the current production and distribution market had been 
owned by the states of nations themselves. Tracing back to 1960s to 80s, Borrell 
and Duncan (1992) discussed how the governments of the US, Brazil, Japan, 
Australia, and Thailand used to control the production and market of sugar, and 
asserted that the world sugar price would have perhaps been too expensive 
unless there had been an intervention. 
Later in the 1990s, however, the effort of freeing domestic sugar markets came 
into realization in the US and America. One of the largest and most efficient sugar 
producers in the world, Brazil, for instance took the measure of reducing and then 
eliminating the export tax on sugar and deregulating the market in 1996 
(Bordonal, et. al., 2018). In Australia, reforms that attracted new investments took 
place in 1997 (Elobeid and Beghin, 2004). The scenario is almost the same in 
different countries.  
Concerning the reasons behind the urge to reform in the ownership structure of 
sugar factories is, however, the economic reform agenda- either consequence of 
changing regimes or the burden of financial crisis which forced the nations to 
recruit lenders policy (Kamski, 2016). In other words, rearrangement of policies, 
both social and economic, of the predecessor is often considered as a means to 
lobby the citizens of many countries to trust the newcomer though failure to 
successfully execute the new policy change cannot be completely free from the 
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influence of traditions and practices. In favour of this, for instance, Larson and 
Borrel (2001) government intervention in the sugar industry has been rooted in the 
trade arrangements nations had established with trade unions in different times 
and innate fear of the authorities suspecting conflict of interests may arise 
between suppliers and producers or distributors.  
Generally, government intervention in any form in the sugar sector has never 
been efficient in many countries. Thus the sector began freeing from government 
intervention gradually when failure of public enterprises to perform well is noticed 
or it is a must for the government to get aid from major aid organizations during 
the financial crisis. Such kind of indirect influence is more common in developing 
countries. Yet the major share of the industry’s investment has remained at the 
hand of the state in various developing nations until in recent times (World Bank, 
1995). This implies, sugar sector privatization is a complex issue with the high 
interest of multiple sectors. 
 
2.6. Factors Determining the Success of Privatization Programs 
Privatization has been a common practice globally since the early 1980s. States 
across the globe sold off enterprises of different kinds and sizes to private 
ownership. In this time, researchers have come with success and failure stories of 
privatization in different nations.  
Based on international experiences, Carson (1999) listed out numerous conditions 
success of privatizations depends on, such as a promising economy with 
adequate national savings, a healthy banking system, a viable capital market, and 
not in a time of high inflation; political commitment to withstand the resistance 
from interest groups and bureaucrats; high level of public acceptance; 
transactional factors like financial expertise, adequate standard of financial 
reporting, permissible collective agreements with labour union and a capacity to 
create legislation to facilitate privatization; and an adequate regulatory framework. 
In their analysis of competitive sectors’ privation, Kikeri and Nellis (2004) brought 
to light the following factors as determinants of privatization success: strong 
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political commitment combined with wider public understanding and support for 
the process; creation of competitive markets-removal of entry and exit barriers, 
financial sector reforms that create commercially oriented banking systems, 
effective regulatory framework-to reinforce the benefits of private ownership; 
transparency in the privatization process and measures to mitigate the social and 
environmental impact. 
The success of privatization also depends on a nation’s economic situation. 
Concerning this, Capriles (n.d) emphasized on a good economic environment for 
the successful accomplishment of a privatization plan. In other words, an open 
and free economy, open markets, no subsidies, and liberalization in all sectors of 
the economy are of critical importance. Moreover, Capriles (n.d) found out good 
financial climate, a stable currency, appropriate laws for investments, tax 
incentives, and in general, an environment of economic growth as critical factors 
for affecting the program. 
In the research aimed at identifying the factors affecting the success of 
privatization in the Hong Kong context, Fun (2010) summarized success factors 
into three: strong political leadership, promising financial environment, and well-
established regulatory framework (p. 21). Perhaps privatization is a politically-
driven initiative. Hence, it is often initiated and concluded by the political 
leadership. Transfer of ownership does not guarantee the private sector if the 
operating environment is not enabling. Similarly, the regulatory environment, 
which is mainly developed and enforced by the state, is indispensable to facilitate 
the duties and responsibilities of all players in a sector.  
Besides strong political leadership, promising financial environment, and effective 
regulatory mechanism in the pioneering Britain, Fun (2010) also added creation of 
effective product market, prioritizing the privatization exercises, putting the state-
owned poor performers onto the priority list for privatization, defusing opposition, 
and the right policy choice to contribute for success in the exemplary privatization 
program of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher in 1970s (p.26-29). Having identified the 
needs of the possible opposition, Thatcher tried to satisfy them in every 
privatization exercise. As a policy choice, stakeholders were encouraged to invest 
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in privatized enterprises. For this purpose, the government set the share price at 
about 10 to 20 % lower to the stakeholders. Thus, the British government had 
carried out a successful privatization program to date. 
In explaining the success of Taiwan’s privatization, Fun (2010) came with four 
new success factors: the creation of a sufficient and clear legal basis for the 
government to conduct privatization; the well-scheduled privatization program; 
holding of residual shares; and protection of employees’ rights and benefits. 
These factors can develop the confidence of the public on the state while 
minimizes potential opposition from the interest groups. 
To put it into a nutshell, privatization is a process that engages various parties and 
thus affected by multiple factors depending on the context and type of subject to 
privatize. Although some of the available literatures present success factors of 
privatization independently, others integrate the factors to form some categories 
like social, economic, political, legal, and so on. Noting both approaches are 
feasible, it is emphasized in this research to assess how individual factors tend to 
affect the sugar sector privatization in Ethiopia.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Study Setting 
The research was conducted in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, one 
of the countries in the African continent. The case of the Sugar Sector was the 
primary focus of the dissertation. Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, a federal 
government entity in charge of administering the sector, was the heart of this 
dissertation.  
 
3.2. Research Design  
This research aimed to assess the factors affecting the process of sugar factories 
privatization initiative in Ethiopia. Both numeric and non-numeric data were 
gathered to achieve this aim. Hence, a mixed research design, which combines 
both qualitative and quantitative data, was used. This design was preferred 
because, as Creswell (2009, p.203) noted, it enables us to gain a comprehensive 
view of all aspects of an issue through combining the “strengths of both qualitative 
and quantitative designs in a single study”. Moreover, the research was a 
description of the state of affairs as it existed at the time of study (Kothari, 2004, 
p.2). The researcher preferred this design to get a deep insight into all parties 
involved in the privatization of sugar factories.  
 
3.3. Target and Study Population 
This dissertation targeted primarily on the private investors who once showed 
interest to buy the Ethiopian sugar sector. In addition to this, key stakeholders of 
the sugar sector including the Ethiopian Investment Commission, members of the 
Ethiopian parliament, particularly the members of Revenue, Budget and State-
Owned Enterprises standing committee, ESC, and MoF took part in the study. 
These key stakeholders were given defined roles and responsibilities in Ethiopian 
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Sugar Corporation establishment regulation (Regulation No. 916/2015, sections 3 
and 4) and other working documents. 
 
3.4. Sampling and Sample Size 
Since this dissertation targeted on a specific unit of population, a non-probability 
sampling method was used to select participants of this study. According to 
Mohsin (2016), non-probability sampling is used when it is impossible to 
conduct probability sampling or when one has a very small population to work 
with. Thus, a purposive sampling method was employed to select participants 
from primary data sources.  In this way, first, participants were selected from 28 
investor groups (20 from international and 8 from Ethiopian origin) which were 
interested in and registered to enter into privatization deal in the sugar sector. The 
groups comprised various numbers of members ranging from 4 to 7; however, 3 
were purposively selected from each group. Thus, 84 questionnaires were 
distributed.  
Similarly, participants of the Focus Group Discussion were selected purposively, 
and based on availability, from the following sectors: 
 Ethiopian Investment Commission- (#2);  
 House of Peoples Representatives- (#2);  
 ESC- (#3); 
 Sugar Enterprises/Factories- (#3);  
 Public Enterprises Holdings and Administration Agency- (#1); and, 
 Other interest groups- a participant from each of the Association of Private 
Consultants (Economic), and influential opposing political parties. Thus, 
thirteen individuals took part in the Focus Group Discussion. 
On the other hand, data were collected from secondary sources directly relevant 
to this study such as Minutes of Parliament Proceedings, and Performance 
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Reports of the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (2016/17-2018/19) to construct items 
and triangulate data. 
 
3.5. Tools of Data Collection and Measurement 
Data were collected by using a close-ended, 5 point Likert type questionnaire and 
Focus Group Discussion. The questionnaire contained 30 independent items, 
based on a scale from “Very High” to “Very Low,” that sought participants’ opinion 
about the potential issues which affect the sugar sector privatization process. The 
items were derived from the analysis of related literature and developed by the 
researcher. The factors were checked for determining the sugar sector 
privatization process in Ethiopia. The items were prepared in such a way that 
participants can express their responses on a Likert Scale. According to Cohen, 
Manion, and Morrison (2007), Likert scales enable to identify feelings and 
opinions. Thus, the private investors’ opinion and thoughts about the impact of 
selected factors on the privatization of the giant enterprises was measured. 
Meanwhile, FGD was carried out based on semi-structured questions which were 
assumed to generate ideas about the factors determining the sugar sector 
privatization initiative.  
 
3.6. Method of Data Collection and Management 
The researcher began data collection by obtaining relevant official documents 
from the sources mentioned above. The data collection was delimited to the 
thematic areas pre-determined based on the objectives of this dissertation.  
The whole data this research required was collected from certain people who had 
good knowledge about the topic at hand. Hence, following document analysis for 
the literature review, participants from private investor groups filled in the 
questionnaire. Recognizing the shortcomings of the Likert method and to 
triangulate the data (Kothari, 2004), discussions were held with key stakeholders 
from government and non-government sectors to gain deep insight into the 
process and factors affecting the overall privatization process. According to 
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Creswell and Miller (2000), Focus Group Discussion is a useful instrument to gain 
a ‘large amount of information’ and particular opinions or attitudes (Hines, 2000; 
Barrows, 2000) in a short time. 
Two group discussions, each lasting for 30 minutes, were held on January 9 and 
16, 2020 consecutively. The discussion group comprised of 13 participants. The 
discussions were moderated by the researcher and Amharic, an official language 
in Ethiopia, was used as a medium.  
 
3.7. Method of Data Analysis 
In line with the approach this research followed to collect both quantitative and 
qualitative data, a mixed-method was used for data analysis (Creswell and Plano-
Clark, 2007). The categories used in the Likert type questionnaire were Very High, 
High, Moderate, Low, and Very Low. Then, the values from 1 to 5 were assigned 
for these scales in the respective order. SPSS (version 21) was employed to work 
out percentages for each statement (as Best and Kahn, 2006, p.351 suggested). 
Inline to Best and Kahn (2006, p.331), however, the two outside categories: "Very 
High" and "High" on one hand and "Low" and "Very Low" on the other hand were 
combined to determine which factors in the main categories needed attention as 
these had been affecting the privatization process. Moreover, the median and 
mode were used as measures of central tendency.   
In the course of searching for further insight of the stakeholders about the factors 
affecting the process and triangulating the responses, qualitative data were 
collected through Focus Group Discussion. Categorizing, coding and grouping of 
the qualitative data took place concurrently during data collection. 4 categories, 
namely legal/institutional, political, socio-economic and market, emerged at this 
stage. Each type of data was first analyzed separately, and then mixed during 
discussion of the findings.  
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3.8. Validity and Reliability 
The validity and reliability of the data collection tools and results were addressed 
appropriately. At the questionnaire construction level, questionnaires with 39 items 
were administered for 19 individuals from private investor groups. Following the 
procedure of item development (Kothari 2004, p. 102) reliability was tested. Thus, 
30 items which had a high discriminatory power remained.  
At the analysis stage, the researcher triangulated the result with the findings of 
earlier studies to ensure validity. In this process the accuracy of the data was 
confirmed through thorough checking.  With regards to reliability, the researcher 
worked out to check the result was confirmed in other studies in which the subject 
was analyzed. To avoid the researcher’s bias, the responses of participants were 
directly quoted from the discussion, and further discussed separately. Finally, 
limitations of the dissertation were reflected so that further studies can get into the 
subject deeper to enhance the validity of the findings.  
 
3.9. Ethical Considerations 
All possible ethical issues were given consideration in the course of this 
dissertation. Since the data sources were high-level government officials and 
individuals from international corporations, the anonymity of their identity was kept 
during data analysis. Yet they were informed that their participation would be 
based on their free will, and so each of them signed a consent form. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS 
This dissertation aimed to examine the factors affecting an investor’s decision to 
invest in Ethiopia’s sugar sector under the current privatization scheme. Data 
were collected in two methods: questionnaire and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). 
The questionnaire comprised items identified based on a review of past 
researches. The items were grouped under legal, political, socio-economic and 
market themes. The questionnaire was filled in by members of the investor team 
members that showed interest in owning the sugar enterprises. Excluding those 
individuals who participated in the pilot study, a total number of 84 (60 from 
international, and 24 from local investors) delivered the questionnaire. However, 6 
questionnaires were not returned. First, demographic data of the participants were 
presented. Then responses of the participants for the items about the impact of 
the given items were analyzed. 
With regard to FGD, participants were selected from all stakeholder units. Due to 
the working nature of participants, the discussion was carried out in two rounds. 
Each discussion lasted 30 minutes. The data obtained through each method were 
presented in two sub-sections. Questionnaire data were presented in section 4.1. 
Discussion data were presented in section 4.2. 
 
4.1. Questionnaire Data Presentation 
4.1.1. Summary of Participants’ Demography 
Among 84 questionnaires distributed, 78 returned (92.9%). Gender, country of 
origin, and experience in the sugar sector investment were presented below. 
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Male
92%
Female
8%
Gender of survey participants in per cent
 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
Figure 4.1: Gender of participants 
 
Figure 4.1 showed that the majority of the respondents (92.31%) were male 
whereas only 7.69 percent of the respondents were female. Some researchers 
showed gender has an impact on decisions. Most importantly gender creates a 
difference in taking the risk margin (Agarwal et. al., 2009).  Moreover, women 
usually invest in a long period of time because on average women live longer than 
men (Montford and Goldsmith, 2016). Thus, gender was likely to affect the private 
investor’s decision in the Ethiopian sugar sector privatization process.  
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Source: Survey data, 2020 
Figure 4.2: Country of origin of investor groups 
 
Figure 4.2 showed most of the investors who showed interest in the sugar sector 
privatization in Ethiopia were from Africa (38.46%), followed by the Middle East 
(28.2%), Asia (23.08%). Europe and the U.S generated 7.69% and (2.56%) of the 
interested investors consecutively. 
When the interested investors were from the countries Ethiopia had a strong 
economic relationship, there was a high tendency to negotiate about transferring 
the loan and interest issues the sugar mills had when the mills were sold to private 
investors. 
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69%
18%
13%
Per cent of participants by years of 
experience
0-3 years
4-7 years
More than 7 years
 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
Figure 4.3: Participants experience in the sugar sector investment 
 
As Figure 4.3 depicted, 54 (69.2%) of the participants had 0-3 years’ experience 
in sugar sector investment. Those who had 4-7 years’ experience account 14 
(18.0%), and the rest 10 (12.8%) had more than 7 years’ experience in related 
sector investment. A study by Mumtaz, et. al. (2018) showed a positive 
relationship between experience and investment. Rakow and Newell (2010) also 
revealed investors who had experience could make a better decision for 
investment. When the investors were novices to the sector, they could be afraid of 
risks as they had limited (or no) experience in how to deal with the challenges in 
the sector. 
 
4.1.2. Responses of participants about the impact of specific factors  
 
In this sub-section, responses of the survey participants for the items derived from 
legal/institutional, political, and socio-economic and market/financial related 
factors were analyzed. 
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4.1.2.1. Factors Relating to Institutional and Legal Structure 
 
Institutional and legal factors comprised of 9 items. For each item, the participants 
were required to mark the degree of impact they thought each had. The 
responses were summarized in the tables below. 
Table 4.1 (a): Responses of participants for items of economic centralism, 
privatization approach and policy 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
1 Policy of 
economic 
centralism 
Very High 21 26.9  
High 26 33.3  
Moderate 15 19.2  
Low 9 11.5  
Very Low 7 9  
Total 78 100 2.0 2 
2 Lack of 
clear 
privatization 
approach 
Very High 35 44.9  
High 19 24.4  
Moderate 13 16.7  
Low 8 10.3  
Very Low 3 3.8  
Total 78 100 2.0 1 
3 Lack of 
privatization 
policy 
Very High 22 28.2  
High 20 25.6  
Moderate 14 17.9  
Low 8 10.3  
Very Low 14 17.9  
Total 78 100 2.0 1 
Source: Survey Result, 2020 
 
Table 4.1(a) depicted responses of participants about the impact of economic 
centralism, privatization approach, and policy. The first item required to what 
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extent the participants agree “policy of economic centralism” affected their 
engagement.  Among 78 participants, 21 (26.9%) replied very high; 26 (33.3%) 
replied high; and 15 (19.2%) replied moderate. On the contrary, 7 (9%) replied 
very low while 99 (11.5) relied very low. On the contrary to this, few, i.e. 3.8% and 
10.3% respectively replied very low and low respectively. 
Item 3 under the legal and institutional factors was about the impact of a lack of 
privatization policy within the specific sector under study. While 78 participants 
provided reply, 22 (28.2%) and 20 (25.6%) replied very high and high respectively. 
While those replied moderate were 14 (17.9%), 14 (17.9%) and 8 (10.3%) 
respectively replied very low and low in this order. 
 
Table 4.1(b): Responses of participants for items of tax rate, investment 
incentives, and operational challenges 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
4 High tax rate Very High 43 55.1  
High 29 37.2  
Moderate 6 7.7  
Total 78 100 1.0 1 
5 Lack of 
investment 
incentives 
Very High 5 6.4  
High 2 2.6  
Moderate 9 11.5  
Low 36 46.2  
Very Low 26 33.3  
Total 78 100 4.0 4 
6 Operational 
challenges 
due to 
restrictions on 
banking 
Very High 50 64.1  
High 13 16.7  
Moderate 15 19.2  
Total 
 
78 
 
100 
 
1.0 1 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
  
34 
 
For the impact of the tax rate item in item 4, almost all (92.3%) replied the impact 
is above moderate while 7.7% replied moderate (Table 4.1(b)). In item 5, the item 
of “lack of investment incentives” received 5(6.4) very high; 2(2.6%) high; 
9(11.5%) moderate; 36(46.2%) low and 26(33.3%) very low. For the item of 
operational challenges including restrictions on the banking sector, the majority 
(64.1%) replied very high; 13(16.7) high; and 15 (19.2%) moderate.  
 
Table 4.1(c): Responses for items about pricing policy, and regulatory institution 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
7 Below the 
market pricing 
policy 
Very High 28 35.9  
High 49 62.8  
Moderate 1 1.3  
Total 78 100 2.0 2 
8 Lack of 
independent 
regulatory 
body 
Very High 2 2.6  
High 19 24.4  
Moderate 12 15.4  
Low 25 32.1  
Very Low 20 25.6  
Total 78 100 4.0 4 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
 
For item 7 about the existing pricing policy in sugar sector, 28 (35.9%) replied very 
high; 49 (62.8%) high; and only 1 (1.3%) replied moderate. On the contrary to this, 
the item of independent regulatory body received 2(2.6%) very high; 19 (24.4%) 
high; 12 (15.4%) moderate; 25 (32.4) low; and 20 (25.6%) very low.  
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Table 4.1(d): Responses of participants about the impact of entry and exit barriers 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
9 High entry 
barriers 
Very High 18 23.1  
High 23 29.5  
Moderate 21 26.9  
Low 11 14.1  
Very Low 5 6.4  
Total 78 100 2.0 2 
10 High exit 
barriers 
Very High 5 6.4  
High 5 6.4  
Moderate 21 26.9  
Low 36 46.2  
Very Low 11 14.1  
Total 78 100 4.0 4 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
 
As presented in Table 4.1(d) above, the last 2 items from legal/institutional factors 
were about the entry and exit factors. For the high entry item in number 9, among 
78 participants, 18 (23.1) replied very high; 23 (29.5%) replied high; 21 (26.9%) 
replied moderate; 11 (14.1%) replied low; and 5 (6.4%) replied very low. With 
regard to high exit barriers, an equal number of 5 (6.4%) participants replied very 
high and high. While 21 (26.9%) replied moderate, 36 (46.2%) and 11 (14.1%) 
respectively replied low and very low. 
Finally, the median and mode values of each item in this category While “Very 
High” was the response with the most frequencies (4 items), “High” appeared as 
the most frequent response for 3 items (1, 7 and 9). The response “Low” 
appeared for 3 items (5, 8 and 10). With regards to median, 2 (Very High) was the 
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positional average of 5 items (1, 2, 3, 7 and 9). While 4 was the median of 3 items 
(5, 8 and 10), 1 became a median for 2 items (4 and 6). 
 
4.1.2.2. Political Factors 
Political factors comprised 6 items. For each item, the participants marked the 
degree of impact in scale from “Very High” to “Very Low”. The responses were 
summarized in the tables below. 
 
Table 4.2(a): Reponses of participants about the economic orientation and 
political instability 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
1 Economic 
orientation of 
the government 
Very High 11 14.1  
High 23 29.5  
Moderate 16 20.5  
Low 9 11.5  
Very Low 19 24.4  
Total 78 100 3.0 2 
2 Political 
instability 
Very High 42 53.8  
High 22 28.2  
Moderate 12 15.4  
Low 2 2.6  
Total 78 100 1.0 1 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
Table 4.2(a) constituted the responses of participants about 4 items relating to the 
political factors affecting the sugar sector privatization process. 78 participants 
replied to each item. For item 1 about the government’s economic orientation, 11 
(14.1%) relied very high; 23 (29.5%) replied high; 16 (205%) replied moderate; 9 
(11.5%) replied low; and 19 (24.4%) replied low. Item 2 was about political 
instability. Among 78 participants, 42 (53.8%) replied it had a very high impact 
  
37 
 
while 22 (28.2%) replied high. While 12 (15.4%) replied moderate, only 2 (2.6%) 
replied low.  
 
Table 4.2(b): Reponses of participants about the resistance from elites and 
interest groups 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
3 Resistance 
from governing 
elites 
Very High 5 6.4  
High 10 12.8  
Moderate 22 28.2  
Low 19 24.4  
Very Low 22 28.2  
Total 78 100 4.0 3* 
4 Opposition from 
interest groups 
Very High 20 25.6  
High 23 29.5  
Moderate 25 32.1  
Low 7 9  
Very Low 3 3.8  
Total 78 100 2.0 3 
* Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
 
For item 3 (resistance from governing elites), 5 (6.4%) replied very high; 10 
(128%) very low; 22 (28.2%) moderate; 19 (24.4%) low and 22 (28.2%) very low. 
Fore opposition from the interest groups (item 4), 20 (25.6%) replied very high; 23 
(295%) high; 25 (32.1%) moderate; 7 (9%) low and 3 (3.8%) replied very low.  
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Table 4.2(c): Reponses of participants for impact of political factors /Continued/  
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
5 Growing 
conflict 
Very High 38 48.7   
High 28 35.9   
Moderate 2 2.6   
Low 10 12.8   
Total 78 100 2.0 1 
6 Fear of 
public 
acceptance 
Very High 10 12.8   
High 16 20.5   
Moderate 32 41   
Low 14 17.9   
Very Low 6 7.7   
Total 78 100 3.0 3 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
 
As presented in Table 4.2(c) above, for item 5 (impact of growing conflicts), 38 
(48.7%) replied very high; 28 (35.9%) replied high; 2 (2.6%) moderate; and 10 
(12.8%) replied low. Finally, for item 6 (fear of public acceptance), 10 (12.8%) 
replied very high; 16 (20.5%) high; 32 (41%) moderate; 6 (7.7%) low and 6 (7.7%) 
very low. 
In terms of mode and median, the data presented on the above tables depicted 3 
(moderate) was the mode for items under the political factors; it was the mode of 
items 3, 4 and 6. The next response was 1 (Very High) which appeared in items 2 
and 4. 2 (Very High) appeared only once in 1. With regards to the median, both 2 
(Very High) and 3 (Moderate) appeared twice as the mid-point in the ranks. The 
median of items 11 and 16 was 3 (Moderate) while it was 2 (Very High) for items 
14 and 15. 4(Low) was the median of one item; i.e. item 13. 
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4.1.2.3. Socio-economic Factors 
Under socio-economic factors, 5 items were covered. For each item, the 
participants were required to mark the degree of impact as 1= Very High; 2= High; 
3= Moderate; 4= Low; and 5= Very Low. Frequency, percent, mean and standard 
deviation for each item was worked out. The responses were summarized in the 
tables presented below. 
[ 
Table 4.3(a): Participants responses about the impact of production cost, 
infrastructure, and currency  
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
1 High 
production 
cost 
Very High 2 2.6  
High 4 5.1  
Moderate 22 28.2  
Low 19 24.4  
Very Low 31 39.7  
Total 78 100 4.0 5 
2 Poor 
infrastructure 
development 
Very High 25 32.1  
High 15 19.2  
Moderate 16 20.5  
Low 12 15.4  
Very low 10 12.8  
Total 78 100 2.0 1 
3 Unstable 
currency 
Very High 17 21.8 
High 12 15.4 
Moderate 23 29.5 
Low 15 19.2 
Very low 11 14.1 
Total 78 100.0 3.0 3 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
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For the item of high production cost in item 1, 2 (2.6%) replied Very High; 4 (5.1%) 
replied High; 22 (28.2%) replied moderate; 19 (24.4%) replied low and 31 (39.7%) 
replied very low. For impact of “poor infrastructure development” in item 2, 25 
(32.1%) replied very high; 15 (19.2%) replied high; 16 (20.5%) replied moderate; 
12 (15.4%) replied low and 10 (12.8%) replied very high. 
Item 3 is about unstable currency. For the impact of this factor, 17 (21.8%) replied 
very high; 12 (15.4%) replied high; 23 (29.5%) replied moderate; 15 (19.2%) 
replied low and 11 (14.1%) replied very low.  
 
Table 4.3(b):- Participants responses about the impact of economic growth and 
sector inefficiency 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
4 Inconsistent 
economic 
growth 
Very High 2 2.6  
High 7 9  
Moderate 38 48.7  
Low 20 25.6  
Very Low 11 14.1  
Total 78 100 3.0 3 
5 Inefficiency 
of the sector 
Very High 39 50  
High 28 35.9  
Moderate 6 7.7  
Low 4 5.1  
Very Low 1 1.3  
Total 78 100 1.5 1 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
 
As Table 4.3(b) depicted, for the impact of inconsistent economic growth in item 4, 
2 (2.6%) replied very high; 7 (9%) replied high; 38 (48.7%) replied moderate; 20 
(25.6%) replied low and 11 (14.1%) replied very low.  Item 5 was about the 
inefficiency of the sugar sector. Among 78 participants, 39 (50%) replied very 
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high; 28 (35.9%) high; 6 (7.7%) moderate; 4 (5.1%) low; and only 1 (1.3%) replied 
very low. 
Finally, the mode and median of items 17-21in the socio-economic category were 
analyzed. 1 (Very High) and 3(Moderate) were the modes of 4 items. 1 was the 
mode of items 18 and 21 while 3 stood for items 19 and 20. The mode of item 17 
was (Very Low). The trend of the median for the items in this category implied 3 
(Moderate) was the median for items 19 and 20; 2 (Very High) for item 18; 4(Low) 
for item 17 and 5 (Very Low) for item 21. 
 
4.1.2.4. Market and Financial Factors 
Finally, market factors comprised 9 items. In a similar vein to the other factors, the 
participants marked the degree of impact they thought each item had from “Very 
High” to “Very Low” in 5 point scales. The responses were summarized on the 
following consecutive tables. 
 
Table 4.4(a): Responses of participants about the factories’ financial position and 
domestic demand 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
1 Weak 
financial 
position of 
factories 
Very High 29 37.2   
High 24 30.8   
Moderate 18 23.1   
Low 6 7.7   
Very Low 1 1.3   
Total 78 100 2.0 1 
2 Static 
domestic 
demand 
Very High 8 10.3   
High 4 5.1   
Moderate 21 26.9   
Low 19 24.4   
Very Low 26 33.3   
Total 78 100 4.0 5 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
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Table 4.4(a) above illustrated the responses of participants for 2 of the 9 items in 
the category of market-related factors. All participants replied to these items. Item 
1 was about the impact of the weak financial position of the sugar factories on the 
privatization process. For this item, 29 (37.2%) replied very high; 24 (30.8%) 
replied high; 18 (23.1%) replied moderate; 6 (7.7%) replied low; and only 1 (1.3%) 
replied very low. For item 2 (static domestic demand), 8 (10.3%) replied very high; 
4 (5.1%) high); 21 (26.9%) replied moderate; 19 (24.4%) replied low; and 26 
(33.3%) replied very low.  
Table 4.4(b): Responses of participants about lack of product demand and market 
access 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
3 Lack of 
demand out 
of home 
Very High 11 14.1   
High 2 2.6   
Moderate 33 42.3   
Low 20 25.6   
Very Low 12 15.4   
Total 78 100 3.0 3 
4 Lack of 
access to 
(regional 
and 
international) 
market 
Very High 11 14.1   
High 20 25.6   
Moderate 20 25.6   
Low 11 14.1   
Very Low 16 20.5   
Total 78 100 3.0 2** 
* Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
 
Item 3 was about the impact of product demand out of the home country (Table 
4.4(b)). For this item, 11 (14.1%) replied very high; 2 (26%) replied high; 33 
(42.3%) replied moderate; 20 (25.6%) replied low; and 12 (15.4%) replied very 
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low. Similarly, 11 (14.1%) replied very high; equally 20 (25.6%) high and 
moderate; 11 (14.1%) low; and 16 (20.5%) replied very low for item 4 (lack of 
access to regional and international market).  
 
Table 4.4(c): Responses of participants about the impact of cost, and FOREX 
environment 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
5 High cost of 
raw 
materials 
and inputs 
Very High 6 7.7   
High 21 26.9   
Moderate 18 23.1   
Low 23 29.5   
Very Low 10 12.8   
Total 78 100 3.0 4 
6 High logistic 
cost 
Very High 32 41   
High 26 33.3   
Moderate 16 20.5   
Low 4 5.1   
Total 78 100 2.0 1 
7 Unattractive 
FOREX 
environment 
Very High 19 24.4   
High 28 35.9   
Moderate 31 39.7   
Total 78 100 2.0 3 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
 
For item 5 (high cost of raw materials and inputs), 6 (7.7%) replied very high; 21 
(26.9%) replied high; 18 (23.1%) replied moderate; 23 (29.5%) replied low; and 10 
(12.%) replied very low (Table 4.4(b)). For item 6 about high logistic cost, 32 
(41%) replied very high); 26 (33.3%) replied high; 16 (20.5%) replied moderate; 
and 4 (5.1%) replied low. Item 7 was about FOREX environment. 19 (24.4%) 
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participants replied its impact was very high; 28 (35.9%) replied high; and 31 
(39.7%) replied moderate.  
For item 8 (illegal import), 1 (1.3%) replied very high; 5 (6.4%) replied high, and an 
equal number of participants (25.6%) replied moderate and low (Table 4.4(c)). For 
this item, 32 (41%) replied the impact of illegal import is very low. Finally, for the 
impact of vulnerability of the sector to foreign competition, 16 (20.5%) replied very 
high; 18 (23.1%) high; 27 (34.6%) replied moderate; 4 (5.1%) low; and 13 (16.7%) 
replied very low. 
 
Table 4.4(d): Responses of participants about the impact of illegal import and 
competition 
Item 
No 
Items Level of 
Impact 
Frequency Percent Median Mode 
8 Illegal import Very High 1 1.3   
High 5 6.4   
Moderate 20 25.6   
Low 20 25.6   
Very Low 32 41   
Total 78 100 2.0 3 
9 Vulnerability 
to foreign 
competition 
Very High 16 20.5   
High 18 23.1   
Medium 27 34.6   
Low 4 5.1   
Very Low 13 16.7   
Total 78 100 3.0 3 
Source: Survey data, 2020 
 
Generally, among the 9 items in this category, the mode was 1(very High) for item 
22 and 27; 2 (High) for item 25; 3 (Moderate) for items 24, 28, 29 and 30; 4 (Low) 
for item 26; and 5 (Very Low) for item 23. 3 was the mode of most items in this 
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category. As it appeared, 2.0 was the median of items 22, 27, 28, and 29; 3.0 was 
the median of items 24, 25, 26, and 30; and 4.0 was the median of item 23. 
4.2. Focus Group Discussion Data Presentation  
In this section, data obtained through discussion with participants selected from 
key stakeholders and Ethiopian Sugar Corporation was presented. The discussion 
was conducted in two rounds. First, a detailed discussion was made to identify the 
factors hindering the success of the sugar enterprise privatization initiative. 
Second, the effectiveness of the initiative from the very beginning to date was 
dealt with. In each round, 13 participants from multiple sectors participated. The 
researcher moderated the discussions. The responses of the participants were 
presented below. 
 
4.2.1. Key Factors Determining the Success of Privatization Process 
Participants (represented by p and marked by numbers to keep their names 
anonymous) reacted to this question in different ways based on their professional 
and career background as well as experience and interest. The first question was, 
“What key factors have been determining the success of the sugar sector 
privatization initiative?” 
P1 underlined the efforts the government did to attract foreign investors to 
Ethiopia. Listing the available incentive schemes for national and foreign 
investors, the participant argued there was no political barrier for investors’ entry. 
P1 added that the privatization initiative was about the transfer of ownership and 
thus government initiated the process. This was the main political support. Yet 
delay in fulfilling preconditions like availing a credible policy that defines the 
privatization modality and role of the public, government, and private investors 
during and after ownership transfer. “We did not know which mills were to be sold 
out; how local and international investors would be treated during the deal; what 
supports government would be rendering at entry or exit level, for instance.” 
P7 argued to the claim that incentives were among the measures government can 
take to encourage investors, but the unattractive environment on which the 
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business has been operating and the absence of legal frameworks had more 
impact on the investors’ decision.  P2 argued with the same stand as P7 did:  
Ethiopian sugar factories are built in rural areas of ethnicity-based 
regional states, far away from the capital Addis Ababa. These areas 
have been centres for political instability in recent times. It is known 
that Ethiopia has been in a State of Emergency for a year and even 
now some regional states are under the command of the national 
defence force. This is the first and foremost factor that affects private 
investors’ decisions. Moreover, while investment is a long time plan, 
transportation from the production centre as well as to ports to get to 
market out of Ethiopia is an issue. 
P4 restated the impact of the political environment in reference to the political elite 
lack of commitment. Explaining this statement, P4 added: 
… Political elites in Ethiopia have a high interest in holding the sugar 
sector for its benefit. Shadowed by the promise to improve the 
livelihood of local the community by creating jobs … the elites do 
their politically profitable business. The intensive budget of financing 
sugar projects can build infrastructure in remote areas…… But it is 
only through these projects that the government can garb land, 
obtain loans, spend money ….. Hence, the government is not 
trustworthy and the private sector knows this.   
“Perhaps investors are aware of the politicians’ interest” said P12. “I think this is 
common globally, investors realize they cannot free from political factors. Rather 
they look thoroughly how friendly the bureaucracy is to their business.” 
In Ethiopia, political factors referred not only to instability and conflict here and 
there; reluctance of government to reflect its commitment in the form of regulation 
and structures were also the manifestations as P3 noted. Here below was P3’s 
reflection: 
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The political elites will never approve any policy or legal framework 
that conflicts with their interest. They never confirm to the 
establishment of any institution if it would challenge their paradigm. 
This makes entry difficult. Hence, I would rather refer to the legal 
frameworks in Ethiopia to reflect on political hindrances. I am not 
feeling comfortable with the proposal of calling private investors 
before creating a friendly law with regards to remittance, or before 
releasing the telecom and banking sector from state control?! The 
legal frameworks that regulate the economic sector in Ethiopia are 
not attractive to investors and thus government deliberately did this 
so as not to lose its control on all mega enterprises including the 
sugar factories, 
“I will get back to the legal constraints P3 tipped,” began P7.  
The political environment is reflected in the relationship a nation builds with 
other nations in the same region or outside. With regards to business, 
nation to nation relationship is about the market for a product or service out 
of the country of origin. When a nation is friendly with its neighbour or 
others, businesses can easily penetrate the market.  
“In terms of legal regimes, sure political factors are enshrined in all laws and 
policies that govern business, market, roles and responsibilities of agencies 
managing a sector, policies governments draft and directions they set for socio-
economic development,”  stated P7. Here were P7’s points: 
…it is the bad political, financial, and market environment, which is also 
reflected in its economic policy, that hampered private sector development. 
Without the stock market, no foreign financial bank and currency problem in 
Ethiopia, call for private investment in capital intensive sugar sector is 
‘ridiculous’. Thus, private investors cannot, and will never; in action respond 
to the current privatization can unless the economic reform is assisted by 
legal and institutional reform.  
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P3 came with contradicting ideas about economic policy. The participant argued 
for the importance of economic centralism noting the country’s developing 
economy and the importance of protection to the enterprises that can drive the 
national economy as follows: 
Lack of national private sector capacity to overtake the enterprises 
and the impact selling these enterprises to the foreigners might have 
on the national economy has been the concern. Delay in reform of 
other policies and legal instruments are also part and parcel of this 
basic stand. ….. Now it is the right time ever to open the door to the 
private sector to sell out the enterprises. We [representatives of 
Ethiopian people] believe Ethiopians afford buying the enterprises as 
foreigners can do. ….. in line with this, other policies and regulations 
are also under review….. I’d rather point out a lack of policy direction 
on the sugar sector development now and in the future… 
P5 forwarded this point specifically on the policy matter: 
Sugar policy is needed to encourage sustainable production for domestic 
(short term) and foreign (medium-term) markets. This is through 
encouraging private investment in the sector to improve efficiency and to fill 
the gap between demand and supply. This requires putting in place 
credible policies and regulations that represent and balance the interest of 
the public and private sectors. In line with is production, trade and pricing 
policies are highly needed. 
“A bad coincidence is the political instability and ethnic conflict emerged when the 
government is initiating reform in multiple sectors. This situation is a threat to the 
private sector to involve in the investment of large scale like buying of sugar 
factories.” P3 
“Could have the sugar factories been sold out unless the political instability 
emerged in recent times? Is it only a coincidence?” asked P12. “Government’s 
initiative to privatize the firms including sugar factories is a critical decision” began 
P5. P5 continued as “All old and new sugar projects are not attractive enough for 
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investors… old mills require capital to revitalize them in such a way they can 
produce to their full capacity; new projects are new and not at the level of 
operation. This will certainly make their value lower. The feasibility of some 
projects is also questionable.” 
P6 further explained market-related factors during the discussion. 
Competitiveness of the sugar firms, supply issues, and financial position of the 
proposed sugar factories were in the participant’s statement: 
Investors often work out when they will get a return on their 
investment. Selling price, taxation rules, production capacity, 
development, labour, and logistic cost, among others are key issues 
they might consider. …. current selling price and tax rate are 
frustrating. Cheap local labour is a reflection of the skill gap. Trained 
staff is available in the international market but this will in turn 
increase production cost. Any investor who owns the projects has to 
pay the loan besides the finance required to renovate them. This is a 
double cost and financial burden.  
P2 argued the financial stand of the sugar factories was not encouraging 
but this was not the case for investors. As P2 stated, the “low financial 
stand of the sugar factories is a critical issue mainly for the owner. The 
value of factories is estimated taking into consideration all the loan burden, 
depreciation, production capacity, and selling price of the product. Yet the 
issue can be a central theme for legal framework development. The way 
how this issue is treated in new laws will remain a concern of negotiation 
for the state and investors.” 
P7 listed down major concerns in the privatization of the sugar firms.  
….. The longer the privatization decision delayed, the more serious 
issues of loan burden, and social and environmental concerns 
became. The sector hoped to bring hard currency through sugar 
export stuck due to a lack of currency even to complete the 
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projects… The shortage of currency and restrictions on foreign 
banks has certainly been a barrier to private investment. 
Participants of this group discussion had divergent views about the social and 
environmental issues which can affect the privatization process. All participants 
shared infrastructure, social, and environmental concerns interested investors 
might find serious.  
….. behind the ethnic conflict and unrest in some regions, there is a 
growing opposition of large scale investment projects in some areas. 
When the community is dissatisfied with any act of the government, 
the reaction is accompanied by destroying the investment or killing 
the personnel. Any firm owned by a foreigner or a staff who came 
out of that specific group becomes a target of the destruction. (P9) 
“Environmental and social challenges also relate to the high cost to respond or 
negative response from interest group. Besides, mitigation of such challenges will 
be of high importance when the private investors overtake the sector” P9 argued.  
As P10 marked, “… appropriate feasibility study and mitigation measures are not 
available to convince the private sector. Since the feasibility of the projects is as 
equally important as the friendliness of the legal and market environment, the 
current privatization initiative outperforms in all …” 
For P10, the location of the sugar projects was a challenge to realize the 
privatization plan. 
The fact that the sugar mills are built far away from the cities is 
stronger also a serious issue. Besides the impact of distance factor 
on logistic cost in the supply chain, location disadvantages a threat 
for life and property of the investors….. some killed, some robbed, 
some hijacked…. With the current road and telecom infrastructure 
accessibility, the private sector, either individually or in all, cannot 
feel confident to enter into investments in remote areas. 
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P4 argued the problem would not last, but P12 and P8 at the same time argued 
against the points. “The current government puts power decentralization and 
empowering local government at the centre; so, disputes can be easily settled….. 
As the current reform has tackled the misconducts and power abuses in 
government structure, people are developing trust in government…. Hence, 
conflicts will no longer emerge as they were before” (P4).  
“The past predicts the future,” P8 stated, and states his argument as 
follows: 
Ethnic based threats and insurgencies have been part of the rule of 
EPRDF, which is reformed as Prosperity Party- PP recently. It is 
now a socially constructed reality that only the local people have the 
right to utilize its resources besides administering itself. People are 
questioning the fairness of resource distribution in launching 
projects. The growing demand for better payment is a cost and 
conflict factor.  
“I think it is not yet the right time to say we failed…. because privatization is a 
process….” P3 opened a new argument line. “Ethiopia is a developmental 
democratic nation... Government has no interest in owning any enterprise except 
the interest of filling the market shortage … until the private sector can emerge in 
a way it can compete to drive the national economy…..”  
“It is ok but….” interrupts P12, and adds “what are the success indicators?” P5 
restated P3’s statement and added new points: 
… Giant public enterprises have grown to the current size through 
the investment and effective management of the current 
government. Privatization is also initiated by the government itself. 
The plan succeeds when the private sector shows interest and bids 
for ownership. Yet, the government has to take further measures in 
creating an enabling ground for private players to respond to the 
privatization call with confidence and trust … 
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P11 underlined tax as a major factor. “Sugar sector like other manufacturing 
industries is experiencing major taxes. Excise tax and Surtax are the most serious 
ones. Excise tax is 33% for sugar. Surtax is an additional tax, levied at a rate of 
10% calculated on other forms of taxes. Tax has a substantial impact on the 
profitability of a sugar operation.”  
All participants confirmed the impact of the current tax regime in Ethiopia on the 
sugar sector’s attractiveness for the private sector. P8 added that the fact 
government sets selling price and high tax could be more vivid when the private 
sector overtook and developed the sugar mills to the capacity they can produce a 
surplus to export. In most other markets it has been the market itself that 
determined the selling price and tax was paid from the profit made by the investor 
on the sale of sugar lower; not as a duty. This would definitely affect the profit 
margin and so “no investment is likely”.   
As P12 emphasized on government intervention on price setting: 
The government controls the entire value chain of sugar in Ethiopia. 
Big estates are owned by the government. Price is also set by the 
government through the Ministry of Trade Hence; government 
intervention of this kind is frankly a determinant factor for the private 
sector investment. 
 
Confirming the comments on setting the price as an issue, P6 added “…as part of 
the economic centralism policy the government follows, and its refusal to liberalize 
the major including banks and telecom, government interference in product price 
setting is a policy-based discouraging for the private sector. Unless government 
refrains from such interference, even a local private sector will not respond to the 
privatization call in practice” P7 and P9 appreciated this point. 
P11 raised inefficiency of the local workforce and unfavourable conditions for 
foreign expatriates as a serious issue. “While labour force is cheaply available, 
negligence and time mismanagement are serious problems.” “… interested 
investors have been keen on this,” P4 explained. “Their assessment focuses on 
  
53 
 
whether expatriates are allowed to work in Ethiopia, and whether remittance is 
allowed.” As P4 elaborated more, “As learned from other sectors foreign investors’ 
involved, low salary for less-skilled employees who need consecutive training was 
a cause for dispute. As this is a cost factor, the private sector takes it as serious.” 
“In all cases, the working culture and human resource productivity is also an 
important factor especially for private investors for it determines the profitability of 
the sector,” P7 adds. 
 
4.2.2. Strengths, Defects and Prospects 
Since the dissertation aimed at identifying major factors that have been affecting 
the sugar sector privatization, adequate time was allocated until the participants 
argue sufficiently. This was followed by questions about the strengths and defects 
of the privatization initiative along with speculations about the likelihood of its 
success. 
“Though it delayed, planning to privatize the sector is a good decision” P12 
echoed. “Investment incentives for the private sector, repetitive calls for 
expression of interest, brainstorming consultations to draft legal frameworks, open 
discussions held abroad with investor groups in various countries, and invitations 
to negotiations with outsourcing the deals with lenders to waive interest and 
extend payment period, ongoing Social Responsibility measures, and audit of 
mills’ financial status, although neither is fully complete.” P3, P9 and P11 in 
common outlined as major strengths.  
P6 reiterated the following: 
… in the recent initiative, the government officially disclosed its plan 
to sell out relatively larger firms. The call for Expression of Interest 
was placed on internationally accessible platforms including the 
Ethiopian Embassies to reach all potential markets. Adequate time 
was given for interested investors to pay a visit to assess the status 
of sugar projects and develop tender documents.  
With regards to the short comes, P9 commented on the shortcomings: 
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The investors have no legal ground that ensures the government is 
really committed to selling out the mills. They are not provided 
adequate industry data so they can take further action. For instance, 
new projects are at different levels of completion, and loan burden. 
This cannot be easily disclosed early. In the current plan, all projects 
are open and the investors have to investigate by themselves to arrive 
at decision.  
P11, however, expressed doubts about the importance of selectiveness. “If the 
government invites investors to choose from selected firms, they will be suspicious 
of the system and lose trust. The public is aware of how important sugar is and 
how it will affect when the sector is totally sold out. Thus, consultations and policy 
responses about the fate of employees as well as the government’s role in 
regulating the market would be responded”.   
“What matters most for the private investors is the financial efficiency of the 
sector. Most sugar factories have not yet begun making profit, end some new 
projects still under development. Hence, the sector will generally be under-valued 
and waste public money. Thus, failure to make the sale in phases- attractive ones 
first, for instance, is a major defect” P10 argued.  
“Perhaps phasing will generate finance to complete less attractive mills and thus 
get the best value” P6 argued, and added timing defects: “The privatization call 
messages primary goal is to fill its financial gap only. Time is needed to ensure 
political stability, make legal and arrangements, and then begin with stable 
industries like telecom so adequate finance can be generated to boost the 
national economy. Stakeholders can also learn from this and successfully 
privatize other sectors…” 
Both P1 and P3 endorsed timing defect. P3 added potential dispute from lenders 
on payment arrangement as a visible shortcoming. Unless the investors from loan 
source countries could buy out the sector, there would be disagreements. Hence, 
negotiation would be a more preferable than an open bid to succeed. The 
participants did not argue against this point. 
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Based on the points participants from different sectors raised, speculations were 
made about the prospects of sugar sector privatization. “Success depends on the 
government’s commitment to fulfil the preconditions” said P1. “It is all about legal 
arrangement that responds to the suspects from interested investors and key 
stakeholders” P1 added.  
P4 echoed with confidence that the brainstorming consultations with stakeholders 
and ongoing policy drafts marked the initiative would succeed soon. P5 and P6 
reflected similar perception. However, only P11 argued “foreign investors will be 
attracted more by other sectors like telecom due to the sugar sector’s financial 
inefficiency while the local private sector cannot afford to buy this capital-intensive 
sector. The national economic and political situation can also affect the investors’ 
decision.” P2 argued, “…the future is gloomy because the situation on the ground 
is not enabling.” Other participants too agreed to this opinion.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
In this chapter the data obtained through both questionnaires and Focus Group 
Discussion were discussed. The result was presented in sub-sections constructed 
in line with the research objectives and themes that emerged during data coding. 
The result of the data analyzed separately in the preceding chapter was then 
mixed and discussed in this unit. Related literature was consulted to consolidate 
the discussion and to validate the findings. 
 
5.1. Factors Affecting the Sugar sector Privatization  
The four key themes the emerged during data analysis in an earlier chapter 
was discussed in this sub-section.  
5.1.1. Legal and Institutional Factors 
Among the 10 items in the legal and institutional factors’ category, high tax rate 
(92.3%), operational challenges due to restrictions on banking (80.8%), and 
pricing policy (98.7%) were found to have very high impact on the sugar sector 
privatization process in Ethiopia. These items fell above the median (2.0). On the 
other half of the median, lack of clear privatization approach (69.2%), policy of 
economic centralism (60.3%), high entry barrier (52.6%), and lack of privatization 
policy for the sugar sector (53.8%) were identified to have a high impact on the 
success of sugar sector privatization process.  
The responses of FGD participants and inferences of the literature review 
confirmed these findings. As noted in review literature (Ethiopian Investment 
Commission, 2015), sugar development levy and excise tax on sugar were two 
major taxes/levies currently impacting the profitability of the Sugar Industry. Levy 
was imposed on sugar products and effectively paid for by the end consumer. The 
excise tax on the cost of production of sugar operations charged 33% of the direct 
production cost, and payable on sales of sugar both to the domestic and export 
markets.   
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The issue of pricing policy was also supported during the discussion. The sugar 
selling price was set by the government itself and the ‘official’ price was 20% 
lower than the next lowest price in the region (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 2018).  
For private investors, however, this price would never result in an insufficient 
return.  
Ethiopia has not yet allowed for foreign commercial banks to operate in the 
country (Getayawkal, 2016), and the local banks were under the state control. 
While there were foreign currencies in Ethiopia, lack of stock exchange and 
capital market, and international banking were challenges for investors either to 
get currency or to take its profit to the home country. Similarly, it was challenging 
for foreign employees to remit their wages to home. For the specific sugar sector 
privatization, the discussion participants confirmed the development of policies 
and guidelines was “underway,” but privatization initiative embarked in before few 
years. While splitting the sectors domestic and international investors can invest in 
Ethiopia, the economic policy in Ethiopia had no vivid statement on whether a 
local private investor could engage in a joint-venture undertaking with a foreign 
investor or not (Investment Code, No. 15/1992). Solomon (2013:25) stated this as 
a “polite way of discouraging foreign private capital investment in Ethiopia.”   
Moreover, as the Ethiopian sugar sector privatization call had no pre-established 
policy ground, evidence was not available on what model and scheme would the 
government follow. Expecting the suggestion from the interested investors 
themselves left the potential investors uncertain even if the government would no 
doubt be pleased with whatever proposal they might come with. Moreover, as the 
sugar projects differ in the level of performance, capacity, financial wellbeing, etc. 
generic call for sale brought no result, because researches revealed that private 
investors can less likely enter into a deal to buy poorly performing, overstaffed or 
larger ones (Boehmer, Nash and Netter, 2003). Thus lack of clear policy was a 
factor affecting the sugar sector privatization process. Nevertheless, lack of 
independent regulatory body (57.7%), high exit barrier (60.3%), and lack of 
investment incentives (79.5%) were ranked to have very low impact in the survey. 
Moreover, the discussion did not bring evidences on the impact of these issues.  
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5.1.2. Political Factors 
Political instability (82.0%), growing conflict (84.6%), opposition from interest 
groups (55.1%), and economic orientation of the government (43.6%) were 
identified as the most determinant factors. All of these items fell above the median 
in which 3 (Moderate) was the mode. While fear of public acceptance (41.0%) had 
a moderate impact, resistance from the governing elites (consolidated sum for 
Very Low = 52.6%) was the least impacting factor. 
Ethiopian government gave protection for private property as guaranteed by 
constitution (FDRE, 1995) and investment code (Investment Proclamation of 2012 
as amended in 2014) besides being a member of the institution which issues 
guarantee against non-commercial risks to enterprises that invest in signatory 
countries (Investment Regulation, 2013), the FGD participants refused to rely on 
such policies amid the country’s political instability in the recent years. Noting the 
State of Emergency was in effect in some parts of the country, political instability 
was taken as a major risk factor for not only the business but also the life of 
individuals. With regard to political risk and government stability, Bortolotti and 
Pinotti (2003) argued that privatization has been more likely in more stable 
regimes. This was because less stable governments were not willing to accept the 
political risk involved in a large privatization.  When the government was stable, it 
would be easier for the ruling party to gain consent for privatization policy 
decisions and the executive enjoys greater stability. 
Unlike Clarke and Cull (2002) findings showing power imbalance between 
decision-makers at either the legislative or executive levels, opposition from 
political parties was less likely to impact investor’s decision. Moreover, less stable 
governments may lack the ability to effectively enforce property and contractual 
rights which in turn are necessary to implement privatization (Clague et. al., 1996).  
However, the impact of “opposition from interest groups” and “fear of public 
acceptance” were found to get insignificant support from the FGD data. As noted 
during the discussion, the current government in Ethiopia has been dominated by 
a single party. Moreover, the public, particularly the local public, could oppose 
depending on the new policy direction if it would affect their interest. Thus, 
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opposition would be unlikely in such cases. On the other hand, the investors fear 
that the government could not successfully make or enforce laws of private 
investment, property protection when it remained weak. Thus, political stability can 
determine its ability to carry out its declared programs, and so taken as a serious 
factor. 
 
5.1.3. Socio-economic Factors  
Among the items in the socio-economic category, the inefficiency of the sugar 
sector (with the consolidated sum of very high and high=85.9%), poor 
infrastructure development (51.3%), and unstable currency (37.2%) were factors 
the analysis revealed as major determinants. The median and mode of the items 
in this category were 3 (moderate). These findings confirmed to the findings of 
researches by Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2008), and Dinc and Gupta (2011), 
which revealed the success of privatization materializes when governments 
sequence privatizations strategically, often leading the most profitable firms to be 
privatized first, and firms with a lower wage bill are likely to be privatized early. In 
the case of the Ethiopian sugar sector, however, the sugar enterprises had been 
performing less efficiently compared to other state-owned firms and this was a 
reason government wanted to sell out the enterprises. Therefore, the current 
financial stand of the sugar factories was one of the factors which discouraged 
private sector investment. In line with this, Caprio and Klingebiel (2000) showed 
that many state-owned enterprises exhibit poor financial performance, possibly 
because they were used to make politically-motivated loans. Thus privatization is 
likely when the sector is loss-making and it is less efficient (Clarke and Cull, 
2002). In terms of high infrastructure demand in localities, participants of 
discussion confirmed it had been among the major determinant factors.  
On the other hand, the inconsistency of national economic growth (48.7%) was 
identified to affect the process at a moderate level; however, high production cost 
(64.1% ranked its impact as very low) was not supported as impacting factors in 
the FGD. This result confirmed to Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (2018) that it 
revealed Ethiopia was a low-cost producer due to the very high productivity of 
cane per unit area and cheaper labour force. 
  
60 
 
5.1.4. Market Factors 
High logistic cost (74.4%), weak financial position of factories (67.9%), 
unattractive FOREX environment (60.3%), and vulnerability to foreign competition 
(43.6%) were identified as the topmost serious market-related factors affecting the 
sugar sector privatization based on the consolidated sum of the scale. It was 
confirmed by FGD that the sugar factories were scattered in different parts of the 
country and so not only transportation to limited port outlets but also to the 
national central market was causing high cost. Moreover, the fact that the sugar 
factories were under the burden of loan and interest, and high demand for subsidy 
from government implied the sector was less attractive to investors.  
As learned from the literature review 10 of the 13 sugar projects offered for sale 
were under different levels of development, because these projects were being 
financed by the loan gained from different countries (Birhanu, 2019). Since the 
interested investor had to value the project at the current stage of development, 
and then negotiate on not only the sale price but also how the loan would be paid 
before entering into any form of privatization deal, the process would require a 
longer time than the government expected. As noted during the Discussion, this 
made the deal ‘hectic,’ and thus the sector became unattractive.  
Causes for FOREX shortage embraced high reliance on imports and inflation 
which government instrumented to generate liquidity (Tadesse, 2018). The 
investors and expatriate employees cannot easily find currency to remit. This 
made the FOREX environment unattractive. Further, the sector’s vulnerability to 
foreign competition was the factor that affected the process of privatization. These 
responses were also supported by FGD and literature (Tadesse, 2018). Lack of 
access to (regional and international) markets (39.7%) was identified to have a 
moderate impact. This is because of limited port outlets on one hand and logistic 
cost as confirmed in the above section on the other hand.  
Finally, the other factors – the high cost of raw materials and inputs (42.3%), 
illegal import (51.3%), lack of demand out of home (41.0%), and static domestic 
demand (57.7%)- were found to have very low impact. Each of these items fell 
exactly below the median. As noted during the discussion, state-owned farms 
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were yielding adequate sugarcane through currency shortage used to cause 
delays in the purchase of imported chemicals. Sugar product demand had been 
high both in the domestic and regional markets (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 
2018). Moreover, unofficial sugar import was mainly encouraged by the shortage 
of the product in the national market, and a high tax on import (Ethiopian 
Economics Association 2019; Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 2018). Thus, both 
literature and discussion confirmed the result of survey data analysis. 
 
5.2. Strengths, Defects and Prospects 
5.2.1. Strengths and Defects 
The data collected through surveys and discussions with key industry 
stakeholders revealed the strengths and defects of the current privatization 
initiative. Since it was for the first time in Ethiopia government planned to 
privatize one of the giant enterprises it owned, the decision was appreciated. The 
initiative was also preceded by incentives for private investors. Among the 
ongoing tasks, brainstorming consultations to draft legal frameworks, discussions 
with investors at potential source counties, and deals with lenders to waive 
interest and extend payment period, were strengths identified. However, the key 
defects of the process comprised delay in legal arrangements (i.e. call for 
privatization before creating enabling legal, financial and market environment); 
lack of adequate industry data; lack of mitigation strategies to combat potential 
opposition from the stakeholders (employees and the public); failure to phase the 
process depending on the efficiency of enterprises; fear of risk due to privatization 
call amid political instability (timing defects); and lack of clear measures to settle a 
potential dispute about loan payment when the ownership transfers.  
 
 5.2.2. The Prospects of Sugar Sector Privatization 
Eventually, the participants of this study revealed divergent views on whether the 
sugar sector privatization would succeed. Considering the impact of significant 
factors on the privatization process and evident weaknesses of the initiative as 
discussed above, the prospects of sugar enterprises privatization were found to 
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be uncertain. Irrespective of the time length privatization of the sugar enterprise 
had been an agenda, the government has not taken adequate measures to 
materialize the initiative. Delay in approving draft legal frameworks sufficiently 
marked government lacked commitment. Thus, it would be too early to confidently 
conclude the initiative would succeed in the absence of the pre-requisites for any 
successful privatization initiative as learned from the literature review.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, conclusion and recommendations were presented. 
6.1. Conclusion 
This dissertation aimed primarily at identifying the major factors affecting the sugar 
sector privatization process in Ethiopia. In line with this, the study found out the 
determinant factors relating to the legal and institutional arrangements governing 
the sugar sector, political situation, socio-economic and market environment in 
Ethiopia, and financial status of the sugar sector itself. Among the legal and 
institutional factors, high tax rate, operational challenges due to restrictions on the 
banking sector, pricing policy were found to have very high impact. Moreover, lack 
of a clear privatization approach and indicative policy for sugar sector 
development, the policy of economic centralism, high entry barrier, and lack of 
privatization policy of this specific sector had an impact on the success of sugar 
sector privatization process.  
In relation to political factors, political instability, growing conflict, opposition from 
interest groups, fear of public acceptance, and economic orientation of the 
government were identified as the most significant factors determining the sugar 
sector privatization process. While fear of public acceptance was marked to have 
a moderate impact on the privatization process, the impact of resistance from the 
governing elites was found to have a very low impact among the political factors. 
Among the socio-economic factors, the inefficiency of the sugar sector, poor 
infrastructure development, and unstable currency were identified to have a very 
high impact on the sugar sector privatization process. Besides, high production 
cost was identified as a factor with very low impact.  
From market and financial aspects, high logistic cost, the weak financial position 
of the sugar enterprises, unattractive FOREX environment, vulnerability to the 
foreign competition, and lack of access to market had a significant impact on the 
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sugar sector privatization process. Among the factors checked for impacting the 
privatization process, however, the high cost of inputs, illegal import, and static 
domestic demand were identified to have the least impact.  
While the Ethiopia government decided to privatize one of the giant enterprises 
under its ownership, and willing to provide incentives for the private investors, the 
current study affirmed the privatization initiative had strengths such as initial 
consultations to avail legal frameworks, dialogue with potential investors, deals 
with financiers, and process transparency. Yet, delay in creating an enabling legal, 
financial, and market along with other socio-economic and political factors put the 
prospects of sugar sector privatization under question. Lack of adequate industry 
data, loops in devising strategies to combat potential opposition from interest 
groups, absence of roadmap about how issues of ownership would transfer, either 
fully or partially, can be handled made the process ambiguous. Consequently, the 
success of the years’ long sugar sector privatization initiative yet remained amid 
uncertainty. Thus, it is soon to confidently conclude the initiative would succeed 
unless future researches prove the Ethiopian government took into account the 
issues identified in this dissertation and puts into effect the suggestions outlined in 
the recommendations section below.  
 
6.2. Recommendations 
 Ethiopian Sugar Corporation should make privatization by phase so that 
the sector can gain financial benefit and use the proceeds of initial 
privatizations to reinvestment in the sector to make other projects saleable. 
 Policymakers should decrease the tax rate to encourage both the private 
sector investment and legal trade.   
 The current sugar selling price government sets is discouraging for the 
private investor planning to produce surplus and export to the world market. 
Policymakers should develop an appropriate measure that protects the 
industry competitiveness in the world market without affecting the domestic 
consumers. So, the price should be left to be decided by the market itself. 
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 In changing unfavourable regulation frameworks, an attractive and 
transparent regulatory regime needs to be in place before private investors 
will take part in the privatization exercise. Future arrangements should take 
into account the following issues: 
 The level of debt and loan- potential investors to take over. Among the 
available options of reducing the debt the enterprise’s sales price and 
consolidating the debt outside of the privatization and sell the 
enterprises debt-free for the full value, the researcher suggests the 
second alternative. 
 As an enabling privatization scheme, and help the public develop 
confidence in the process while minimizing potential resistance, the 
Ethiopian Sugar Sector should retain a major share of the equity with 
future possibilities to sell it out gradually.  
 Because investment in the sugar sectors has risks due to the volatile 
world prices, investment protection in the form of import duty or variable 
tariff that alters depending on the level of world prices should be in 
place to enhance the private sector certainty. Moreover, the Ethiopian 
Sugar Sector has to coordinate the concerned stakeholders to ensure 
political stability and security to guarantee life and property protection in 
project areas. 
 The FDRE Ministry of Finance should develop and enforce a separate sugar 
policy so as to encourage sustainable production for domestic and foreign 
markets when the private sector owns the sector. 
 To avoid fear of public acceptance and resistance from the interest group, 
policy consultation should take as equally important as the policy 
arrangements. The Ethiopian Sugar Sector management has to coordinate the 
consultations with the Investment Commission and Ministry of Finance and 
other national stakeholders, have to negotiate with the potential private 
investors from countries that source loan. The results of such consultations 
should be provided for the private investors to minimize their fear. 
 Finally, an attractive strategy should be developed to avail foreign currency for 
investors. With this regard, the House of Peoples Representatives, in which some 
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of the ESC board members are a member, should initiate and enforce 
implementation of a special guideline on how private investors and expatriate 
employees can get foreign currency.  
 
6.3. Limitation and Future Research  
The current work has a few limitations. As the dissertation focuses only on the 
sugar sector, the results cannot be generalized to the other sectors which the 
Ethiopian government is planning to privatize. The study framework covers a few 
issues relating to the four main factors; however, there may be more factors that 
can affect the privatization process.  
In this dissertation, key participants were private investors and key stakeholders 
from government and private agencies at the federal level in the country. Involving 
employees of the sugar projects and local administrations might in the future 
result in better results. Therefore, future researchers can include more issues and 
include participants from all interest groups.    
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 Appendices 
Appendix I: Private Investors Questionnaire 
Part I: General Information 
Please circle the letter that identifies you. 
1. Gender  
A. Male  B. Female C. Do not mention 
2. Country of origin: 
A. U.S.A       B. South America C. Asia    D. Middle East  
E. Africa     F. Other (Please specify)    
3. Experience in the sugar sector investment (in years): 
  A. 0-3 Years B. 4-7 Years C. More than 7 years 
 
Part II: Factors Affecting the Sugar Sector Privatization Process 
The following table consists items that measure your opinion about the impact of 
factors affecting the Ethiopian sugar sector privatization. The degree of impact 
each factor has will be determined on the basis of your responses. As the issue 
first impresses you, please check (X or √ ) the option that best applies: VH= Very 
High; H= High; M= Moderate; L= Low; and, VL= Very Low. 
S.No How high or low have each of 
the following factors impacted 
the sugar factories privatization 
initiative in Ethiopia? 
Scale 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low Very 
Low 
1 Policy of economic centralism       
2 Lack of clear privatization approach      
3 Lack of privatization policy      
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Factors…/Continued from page 1/ 
S.No How high or low have each of the 
following factors impacted the 
sugar factories privatization 
initiative in Ethiopia? 
Scale 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low Very 
Low 
4 High tax rate      
5 Lack of investment incentives      
6 Operational challenges due to 
restrictions on banking   
     
7 Below the market pricing policy      
8 Lack of independent regulatory body      
9 High entry barriers      
10 High exit barriers      
11 Economic orientation of the 
government 
     
12 Political instability       
13 Resistance from governing elites      
14 Opposition from interest groups      
15 Growing conflict       
16 Fear of public acceptance      
17 High production cost      
18 Poor infrastructure development      
19 Unstable currency      
20 Inconsistent economic growth      
21 Inefficiency of the sector      
22 Weak financial position of factories       
23 Static domestic demand      
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Factors …./ Continued from page 2/ 
S.No How high or low have each of 
the following factors impacted 
the sugar factories privatization 
initiative in Ethiopia? 
Scale 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low Very 
Low 
24 Lack of demand out of home       
25 Limited access to (regional and 
international) market 
     
26 High cost of raw materials and 
inputs 
     
27 High logistic cost      
28 Unattractive FOREX environment      
29 Illegal import      
30 Vulnerability to foreign competition      
 
Part V: Final Remarks 
1. What other factors do you think will make investment in sugar sector non-
feasible?            
            
             
2. What strengths and/or defects do you see in the initiative of sugar sector 
privatization in Ethiopia?         
           
            
3. What is your future plan about investing in this sector in Ethiopia?  
           
            
***** The End *****
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Appendix II: Guiding Questions for Focus Group Discussion  
1. What key factors are determining the success of privatization initiative? 
1.1. Institutional/legal arrangements? 
1.2. Relating to the political situation? 
1.3. Socio-economic factors? 
1.4. Product market and financial? 
2. How effectively is the sugar enterprises privatization initiative planned and 
executed? 
3. What main issues will remain affecting the success of the privatization plan, 
and thus need swift response? 
4. Additional points with regards to the factors affecting the success of 
Ethiopian sugar sector privatization? 
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Appendix III: Participant Consent Form 
 
Purpose and Procedure: This questionnaire designed to collect data for the 
dissertation to fulfil the requirements of MBA- International Business.  
 
The information gathered is solely for the academic use, and all respondents will 
be kept confidential and anonymous. It would be appreciated if you would take a 
few minutes of your time to complete this survey. If you have any questions or 
concerns, please contact me at +251 974 85 89 61 or email: 
charesamago1980@gmail.com. Thank you!  
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study/Confidentiality: Participation in this study is 
entirely voluntary and you may refuse to complete the study at any point during 
the survey. Your personal information or name will not be revealed or shared.  
 
Contacts and Questions: You may ask questions regarding this study at any 
time. If you have further questions or would like to know the results of the study, 
please leave your email address below. Email: 
_____________________________________  
 
Statement of Consent: I state that:  
• I have read the above information  
• Any questions and concerns, regarding survey, have been addressed. 
• I give consent to participate in this study 
• I understand that this study will not involve any greater risk than those 
ordinarily occurring in daily life.  
 
Name of Participant: ________________________________  
Signature of Participant: _____________________________  
Date: _________________ 
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Appendix IV: Consolidated sum of survey responses  
S.
No 
Item Responses Very 
High 
High Moderate Low Very 
Low 
1 Policy of economic 
centralism 
frequency 47  15  16 
% 60.3  19.2  20.5 
2 Lack of clear 
privatization approach 
frequency 54  13  11 
% 69.2  16.7  14.1 
3 Lack of privatization 
policy 
frequency 42  14  22 
% 53.8  17.9  28.2 
4 High tax rate frequency 72  6  6 
% 92.3  7.7  7.7 
5 Lack of investment 
incentives 
frequency 7  9  62 
% 9.0  11.5  79.5 
6 Operational challenges 
due to restrictions on 
banking   
frequency 63  15  15 
% 80.8  19.2  19.2 
7 Below the market 
pricing policy 
frequency 77  1  1 
% 98.7  1.3  1.3 
8 Lack of independent 
regulatory body 
frequency 21  12  45 
% 26.9  15.4  57.7 
9 High entry barriers frequency 41  21  16 
% 52.6  26.9  20.5 
10 High exit barriers frequency 10  21  47 
% 12.8  26.9  60.3 
11 Economic orientation 
of the government 
frequency 34  16  28 
% 43.6  20.5  35.9 
12 Political instability frequency 64  12  2 
% 82.1  15.4  2.6 
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Consolidated sum of survey responses  /Continued from page 87/ 
S.
No 
Item Responses Very 
High 
High Moderate Low Very 
Low 
13 Resistance from 
governing elites 
Frequency 15  22  41 
% 19.2  28.2  52.6 
14 Opposition from 
interest groups 
Frequency 43  25  10 
% 55.1  32.1  12.8 
15 Growing conflict Frequency 66  2  10 
% 84.6  2.6  12.8 
16 Fear of public 
acceptance 
Frequency 26  32  20 
% 33.3  41.0  25.6 
17 High production cost Frequency 6  22  50 
% 7.7  28.2  64.1 
18 Poor infrastructure 
development 
Frequency 40  16  22 
% 51.3  20.5  28.2 
19 Unstable currency Frequency 29  23  26 
% 37.2  29.5  33.3 
20 Inconsistent economic 
growth 
Frequency 9  38  31 
% 11.5  48.7  39.7 
21 Inefficiency of the 
sector 
Frequency 67  6  5 
% 85.9  7.7  6.4 
22 Weak financial position 
of factories 
Frequency 53  18  7 
% 67.9  23.1  9.0 
23 Static domestic 
demand 
Frequency 12  21  45 
% 15.4  26.9  57.7 
24 Lack of demand out of 
home 
Frequency 13  33  32 
% 16.7  42.3  41.0 
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Consolidated sum of survey responses /Continued from page 88/ 
S.
No 
Item Responses Very 
High 
High Moderate Low Very 
Low 
25 Lack of access to 
(regional and 
international) market 
frequency 31  20  27 
% 39.7  25.6  34.6 
26 High cost of raw 
materials and inputs 
frequency 27  18  33 
% 34.6  23.1  42.3 
27 High logistic cost frequency 58  16  4 
% 74.4  20.5  5.1 
28 Unattractive FOREX 
environment 
frequency 47  31  0 
% 60.3  39.7  0 
29 Illegal import frequency 6  32  40 
% 7.7  41.0  51.3 
30 Vulnerability to foreign 
competition 
frequency 34  27  17 
% 43.6  34.6  21.8 
 
 
 
 
